Rethinking the Relationships between Livelihoods and Ethnicity in Highland China, Vietnam, and Laos

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In the far south of China and the neighbouring lands of Southeast Asia there is a mountainous zone that stretches some thousand kilometres from the South China Sea to the Himalayas. This land is not snow-capped nor entirely rocky but instead features a mixture of forest, rain-fed agriculture, and rice terraces that sometimes extend to the very top of steep slopes in deep valleys that criss-cross the region. More than 200 million people distributed over eight countries live in this zone, of which about half belong to ethnic minorities living chiefly in scattered hamlets, villages, and market towns in a staggering array of cultural diversity. This vast region, which we call the Southeast Asian Massif (Michaud 2000a), is now increasingly opening up to investment, regional planning, and development interventions, often as countries change from socialism to more liberal markets and political systems. Yet, despite its size and importance, there has been little in-depth research about how people make a living or about the interconnections of cultural diversity, political and economic change, and livelihoods in these highlands.

This book presents a number of rich analyses of livelihoods and cultural diversity in selected parts of this region. More specifically, the authors of the chapters here investigate the relationships between livelihoods and ethnicity in the high borderlands of socialist China, Vietnam, and Laos, which together represent more than two-thirds of the Massif’s surface and an even greater proportion of its population. The aim of the book is to present locally grounded analyses of how ethnic minorities there fashion livelihoods, and to question how ethnicity affects, and is influenced by, economic and political changes in relation to these livelihoods. We believe this discussion provides much-needed local information about this complex region. It also demonstrates the role of cultural and ethnic networks as an under-acknowledged influence in the livelihood strategies of so-called “poor people.” This approach is crucial for better informing discussions on poverty alleviation and livelihoods in general; perhaps even more so for the countries of China,
Vietnam, and Laos, which have now opened up to marketization and political reform after years of centrally planned economies under state socialism.

Together, the authors in this book make three key arguments. First, we suggest that the ways local populations on the margins of centralized states in the Southeast Asian Massif make a living and maintain their identities are shaped both by external forces – such as the state and the market – and by their own agency. Indeed, marginal highland groups demonstrate particular, locally rooted, and culturally informed agency that, in our opinion, is often overlooked in generalized approaches to livelihoods within development practice.

Second, we believe that understanding highland livelihoods in the Southeast Asian Massif as a whole requires a more nuanced appreciation of transnationalism than considering highland people simply in terms of “national minorities.” Many upland groups engage in cross-border trade, or have current or historical social networks across state borders. Some existing analyses of upland marginal groups in Asia fail to notice this transnationalism. Civilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities, edited by Christopher Duncan (2004), is an important work that summarizes problems and challenges for minority peoples in almost all the countries officially located in Southeast Asia. While having many merits, it overlooks not only cross-border issues within Southeast Asia but also the situation in the adjacent uplands of China, Bangladesh, and India. The overall picture thus produced is country-focused, fitting chiefly the needs of modern political analyses determined by state boundaries – national policies addressing national minorities. Moving on from such an approach, we demonstrate in this book that there is a compelling logic in choosing to study highland groups in the Massif transnationally and, in particular here, those of southwest China along with those adjacent in Vietnam and Laos, where borderlands opened only recently to outside scholarly inquiry, with little research of this kind having yet been published (see Lim Joo Jock 1984; Evans, Hutton, and Kuah 2000).

Third, we choose to adopt a more complex stance toward assumptions made about this region being a single and, in some ways, coherent social space. Willem van Schendel (2002, 647) proposed to call the wider mountainous region from the coast of Vietnam to Tibet – and even to Afghanistan, as he suggested later – “Zomia,” and claimed it was unexamined because it “lacked strong centers of state formation, was politically ambiguous, and did not command sufficient scholarly clout.” Along those same lines, political scientist James C. Scott (2009), in his thought provoking book The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, picks up the baton and labels Zomia – which he confines, however, to the eastern section of van Schendel’s original Zomia, thus equating Zomia with the same region
on which this book focuses – as “the last great enclosure.” For Scott, this is where a wide variety of populations have historically taken refuge from the surrounding “civilizations” in order to pursue an age-old or, in some cases, a renewed interest in the remarkable project of living in a stateless society (or at least in a space where the state does not control people significantly). Although we look at such considerations made from a distance sympathetically, we argue for a more refined reflection from the ground up and a more dynamic understanding of the relationships between (marginal) local subjects, (global) market forces, and (national) states.

In other words, the authors in this book use locally grounded studies to reveal the unexpected ways in which people on the margins do not just get onboard and accept (socialist) modernity, but how many use their agency to maintain direction over their lives and livelihoods despite current and far-reaching changes to economic conditions and political authority.

**The Southeast Asian Massif**

We will expand more on the claims outlined previously and their rationales shortly, but first, it is helpful to more precisely locate the subjects of this book. The Southeast Asian Massif, as we define it, brings together the highlands of all the countries sharing a large chunk of the southeastern portion of the Asian land mass. These lie roughly east of the lower Brahmaputra River, in India and Bangladesh, and south of the Yangtze River in China, all the way to the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand at its southernmost extension (see Figure 1.1; Michaud 2006). As of 2008, as we mentioned, about 100 million of the Massif’s inhabitants belong to ethnicities that are distinct from the lowland majorities who form the cultural core in each of these eight countries, that is the Han (China), Kinh (Vietnam), Burman (Burma/Myanmar), Bengali (Bangladesh and northeastern India), Thai (Thailand), Lao (Laos), and Khmer (Cambodia) majorities. Over the course of centuries these dominant lowland ethnic groups have – more or less firmly – ruled the highlands and their populations; albeit often with important disagreements. As such, one of the themes we address in this book is how these relationships have affected ethnicity and livelihood strategies.

We have selected three socialist states for analysis: the People’s Republic of China, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. These are countries where, because of their participation in the world’s Communist “brotherhood” (Evans and Rowley 1984), a fused ideology has guided state dealings with “minority nationalities” (Michaud 2009, 30). Academic research on these populations by non-Communist academics was virtually impossible for several decades, roughly from 1945 to 1990. It is therefore useful and timely that the authors included in this book have been able to perform lengthy field-based investigations in these socialist
settings and that they have developed intimate knowledge of the lived experiences of ethnic minorities in these highlands, and of what making a livelihood on the margins of a Communist state involves. Some may argue that nowadays, what are often called the post-socialist regimes of China, Vietnam, and Laos, have little in common beyond the worn-out veneer of previously being highly centralized revolutionary regimes, that have gradually departed from Marxist orthodoxy and have now opened up to the liberal market economy – China in 1978, Vietnam and Laos in 1986. Certainly, all three countries are liberalizing their economic activities. But at the same time, these three regimes share a unique ideology directing the relationships of the state with minority groups dwelling within their national borders. In China, Nicholas Tapp (2001) has shown that the Soviet model, based on Josef Stalin’s considerations (1913) of the “nation,”
and the policies they eventually entailed, served as a template for strategies in the 1930s of alliance building between the Communist Party of China and minority groups whose support was essential to ensure victory over Republican forces. In Vietnam, the strategy that linked the Viet Minh’s political project with highland minorities closely followed the Chinese model, in this and many other aspects of the revolutionary struggle (McAlister 1967; Michaud 2000b). Furthermore, Yves Goudineau (2000) showed that in Laos the USSR-China-Vietnam ideological stance on minorities triggered a similar response.

Indeed, the parallels in approaches to ethnic minorities in China, Vietnam, and Laos raise several important questions for ethnicity, livelihoods, and state-society relationships. Many authors have acknowledged that the various national Communist revolutions in these locales could not have been successful without strategic wartime alliances with minority groups on the margins. For example, it is well known now that in China, the Yi of Yunnan sheltered and protected the fleeing Communist troops during the Long March of the 1930s (Mueggler 2001; Harrell 2002). In Vietnam, the Tày of Bac Thái province hosted and fed Viet Minh leaders in hiding from French colonial troops for years, while the Thái in northwestern Vietnam were instrumental in the decisive victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 (Michaud 2000b, 352-53). In Laos, with the majority of its national territory located in mountainous areas, the Communist triumph was possible only with the support of scores of highland allies (Goudineau 2000; Pholsena 2007). In all three countries, revolutionary leaders had to provide assurances of political autonomy to highland peoples, and included this in early drafts of national constitutions. This way, many ethnic minorities decided to ally with the Communist forces in hope of some political reward (McAlister 1967; MacKerras 2003).

Yet once Communist victories were achieved, the new socialist states cunningly backtracked in unison. They argued that wartime pledges could not be carried out effectively without endangering the socialist project and the very existence of the new socialist nations. Early commitments to grant political autonomy were toned down, diluted, or sometimes plainly forgotten. In clear contradiction to all the promises made, these socialist states instead took the stance that highland margins and their populations could not be given real self-government. On the contrary, minorities had to readily accept to be ever more firmly attached to the central state and to the socialist project of establishing a unified citizenship seeking uniform and predefined goals. Ironically, an important tool to achieve this forced marriage involved a decoy strategy of setting up showcase, largely powerless “autonomous territories” where sizable numbers of minority occupants were dwelling – one of Stalin’s original precepts. In China’s southwestern upland border zone, this practice became policy for the first time shortly after the Communist
victory of 1949, while in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), these came into existence in 1955, right after independence.

The modern practice of organizational segregation of mountainous areas in the Southeast Asian Massif can be traced back to British Burma, which set up administrative enclaves in the nineteenth century for numerically important ethnic groups, such as the Shan, Chin, and Kachin. Not long after, the French in Indochina took the same route with the Military Territories policy implemented in 1891 (Condominas 1978; Michaud 2000b, 344). As elsewhere throughout the colonial world, these constituted rather crude attempts at dividing local societies to rule them more efficiently, in this case by encouraging an upland-lowland fracture rooted in ancient cultural distinctions. For the colonial powers, to ally with upland minority leaders served the purpose of thwarting nationalist sentiments and weakening resistance among the lowland majorities. It is not surprising that, in time, victorious socialist regimes in the region pragmatically accepted this heritage and used it to their own ends, blending it with original Soviet ideology.

Today, highlanders in the socialist portion of the Southeast Asian Massif are still facing governments that in large part lack dependable information about their history, cultural distinctiveness, and aspirations for the present and the future. More importantly, it seems these governments, taken by their fast-paced neo-liberal national growth agendas, often lack even the interest to learn more about ethnic minorities. Instead, they vigorously implement nationwide policies of cultural integration and economic standardization. Education, for instance, in principle a tool for emancipation, is geared instead toward Sinization, Lao-ization, and Vietnamization (Goudineau 2000; Potter 2007).5

For the most part, the region’s state programs are attuned to growth and progress. The dominant rhetoric, after decades of applied social evolutionism inherited from strict Marxist ideology, has now moved increasingly toward the language of economic growth and development. Development agencies from the affluent world are joining governments to apply the technology of the international development industry to ethnic minority health, education, and agricultural practices; in the process, traditional practices end up being labelled as obsolete or even harmful, especially to the environment. Although the general indicators of health and education undeniably show an upgrading among highland populations, these initiatives also play directly into the national governments’ strategies of integrating minorities into the central national economy and identity. In the process, cultural distinction is paid only subsidiary attention, with an array of other issues being judged incomparably more urgent.

China clearly has a strong central policy of controlling and integrating shaoshu minzu, minority nationalities, in its southwestern borderlands (Unger
1997; Baranovitch 2001; MacKerras 2001, Michaud 2009). This region is politically sensitive because it touches several international borders. It is also rich in natural resources important to the national economy, it provides a substantial portion of the country’s diet through intensive agriculture, and it is a land of migration for many lowland citizens (Blum 2002; Wilkerson 2003). From the state’s viewpoint, migration of lowland Han people to the margins of China might be motivated by a desire to eventually outnumber locals and take final political, economic, and cultural control over these margins (Harrell 2001; MacKerras 2003). Indeed, China’s Go West campaign is an ambitious state-sponsored series of investments and land use plans that aim to bring development to provinces that would not usually attract the same level of industrialization as the seaboard. Started in 2000, the campaign aims to steer state investment, outside expertise, foreign loans, and private capital into western provinces of China, especially Yunnan, the province that occupies much of China’s portion of the Southeast Asian Massif. Some of these activities include turning existing towns and cities into regional centres of economic development, such as the provincial capital Kunming. Yet, there has also been resettlement of villages in order to change the distribution of population in affected areas, and the reforestation of previously agricultural land by plantation forestry. Some commentators fear that the non-Han populations living in southwest China will find their societies, languages, and cultures threatened by these activities and the immigration of lowland Han (Plafker 2001). Picking up on this program, four chapters in this book consider various aspects of the Go West campaign (Gros, McKinnon, Swain, and Sturgeon). They illustrate that resistance in remote locations of southwest China to such programs exists, while taking covert, restrained forms.

In Vietnam, the state has officially made its peace with its các dân tộc thiểu số, the minority nationalities, through their legal enshrinement in official polity since the late 1970s (McElwee 2004). But the Vietnamese government still considers dangerous political resistance to be simmering in the Central Highlands and elsewhere. The government has denounced political support for minorities coming from mainly US-based organizations, often made up of Vietnamese who fled the country in the 1970s and whom the government branded reactionary (Anonymous 2002; Salemink 2003). Christian missionary activism is a bone of contention, chiefly in the south, but increasingly in the northern highlands too. As a countermeasure, education is seen as a tool for the state to preserve carefully selected and benign features of local highland cultures (Nong Quoc Chan 1978) while showing the public eye the face of a benevolent state preserving minority cultures (McElwee 2004).

In Laos, the government has adopted a vigorous relocation program in order to move some minority ethnicities (sonphao) from upland areas to the lowlands and to force scores of highland villagers into larger groupings (see
Daviau, Évrard, this volume). This approach allows highlanders to be placed directly under the Lao state’s gaze – a form of national panopticon as it were. Also, a deeply rooted mistrust between the socialist state and old royalist factions among certain highland groups has ensured that armed struggles endured long after the revolution was officially over in 1975. The Xaysomboun Special Region in northern Laos, an area sealed off from outside observers, was enforced from 1994 to 2006 to isolate pockets of minority resistance to the Laotian forces. Clearly, however, with nearly half its population belonging to one or another of many non-Lao ethnicities, Laos cannot afford to wage an all-out confrontation on its minorities, and a degree of negotiation has to prevail (Goudineau 2003; Ovesen 2004; Soukamneuth 2006).

The Implications of Ethnicity
In this culturally complex, mountainous transnational setting, authors in this book reflect on the relationships between ethnicity and livelihood practices on the frontiers of the state (see Brown 1994; Donnan and Wilson 1994; Lamont and Molnar 2002). But what do we mean by “ethnicity”? And why is this important in state-society relations and livelihood strategies? Within the expansive field of identity studies, ethnicity generally refers to kinship, group solidarity, common culture, and shared strategy (see Barth 1969, 1999; Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Cohen 1978; Gordon 1978; Yinger 1985; Nash 1989; Thompson 1989; Banks 1996; Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Eriksen 2002; Cornell and Hartmann 2007). To the possible exception of increasingly industrialized urban settings where anonymity can sometime prevail over most other components of individual and group identity (Fong and Shibuya 2005), blood ties and regionalism have always, and still do, play a crucial role in defining individuals as part of groups, and groups as distinct from each other (Rata and Openshaw 2006).

But it would be a mistake to presume that ethnicity thus implies an essential, fixed, or unchanging form of identity rooted only in biology and location (Melucci, Keane, and Mier 1989).7 For many years during the European colonial era and then during Communist regimes in the twentieth century, defining an ethnic group was above all an act of classification and control. Administrators saw indigenous cultures as fixed entities – “tribes” (Sahlins 1968) – with permanent characteristics in the likes of skin colour and facial features, and circumstantial evidence such as location and dress, as determining exactly who was or was not Karen, Masai, or Maori (see Sollors 1996).

The social sciences have since come a long way. Ethnicity today is believed to refer to personal and collective decisions, circumstantial strategies, and various other influences that sustain a discrete and negotiable form of collective identity (Jenkins 1997). Indeed, this was a tenet of the influential Political Systems of Highland Burma by Edmund Leach (1954), which found
that the ethnic group called the Kachin was actually far more differentiated
than initially thought, and communal identities were more contingent on
short-term strategies and needs than outsiders predicted. As later summar-
ized by Eriksen (2005, 353), ethnicity came to be seen as comprising aspects
of both symbolic meaning and instrumental utility. These forces may be
defined as desires to fit in (such as via belonging or compliance) and strategies
to opt out (via distinction, resistance, or defiance), which together compose
an astoundingly complex and highly localized set of factors forming the
agency of a particular group (Sollors 1989). Indeed, agency is a vital notion
in this book; it is the instrument by which local responses to external pres-
sures for change are conceived and put in practice (Holland et al. 2001). It
is the highly localized element defying the routine elaboration and applica-
tion of overarching models of development and integration of local societies
into nations, the market, and the global world.

The ethnic factor is everywhere. Around the world, internal hostility to-
ward ethnically distinct groups within national borders surfaces with a
stubborn regularity in Burma, the Sudan, Iraq, India, China, Indonesia, and
Brazil to name just a few zones where ethnic tensions flare (see Eller 1999).
The so-called developed world is not immune either, as recent incidences
of ethnic war and ethnic cleansing experienced in Eastern Europe demon-
strate (Cigar 1995). Furthermore, policies of singling out and excluding
specific ethnic identities are still rampant in the United States, Canada,
Mexico, Australia, Germany, Switzerland, and France (Dean and Levi 2003).
Ethnic factors can be invoked to support both affirmative action and the
harshest political projects (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005). But the ethnic
factor, in all its fluidity, is also a powerful tool for understanding human
behaviour in context, including, for our purpose here, how certain peoples
in given locations negotiate their livelihoods (Lamont and Molnar 2002).
In fact, it is so powerful that we contend that neglecting ethnicity and its
local cultural determinants will ensure the long-term failure of effective good
governance and development programs. Many contemporary approaches
to livelihoods and development, we contend, do not pay sufficient attention
to this challenge.

Recent debates on ethnicity have been lively. Essentialists (see Fuchs 2005),
primordialists (Geertz 1963; Eller and Coughman 1993), and sociobiologists
(van den Berghe 1987) have long insisted on blood ties and locality as the
key elements of ethnicity over other possible dimensions. This position is
fragile: Is one's brother really automatically one's best ally or trading partner?
Are different ethnic groups necessarily prohibited by custom to marry across
ethnic boundaries? Clearly, interracial, inter-ethnic, or cross-class cooper-
ation occurs and is not routinely doomed, even if social customs exist to
ascribe limits to it. At the other end of the spectrum, instrumentalists insist
that, nowadays, ethnicity is not rooted in essence. They argue that ethnicity
is in fact nothing but a short-term, instrumental construction that is used by specific actors to achieve specific ends. This drastically opposite position is equally fragile: Can a Hindu really move across castes freely and without hindrance (Reddy 2005)? Will the Sicilian mafia, the Japanese Yakuza society, and the Chinese Triads smoothly admit members from any racial background? Indeed, could the American voters elect a black president without ever raising the issue of race? And finally, in parallel, Marxist analyses have argued against ethnicity being related to any of the above. Friedman’s classic work (1979) challenged Leach’s emphasis on local explanations for ethnic identity and instead claimed that ethnicity and indeed culture are themselves produced through market forces and modes of production (see also O’Connor 1995; the new introduction to Friedman in 1998; Robinne and Sadan 2007).

Efforts at bridging the gap between such extremes have led to a middle ground based on propositions such as those supported by transactionalist and ethnosymbolist arguments (Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart 1995; Hutchinson and Smith 1996). The majority of proponents of such conciliatory positions see ethnicity as partly biological (visible in marriage preference, inheritance patterns, preferred trading association, clustering in times of adversity, and so on), and partly subjective and political (visible, for instance, in strategic grouping and modern urban lifestyles that allow diverse, competing identities encouraged by volatile technologies, challenges, and living circumstances) (Sanders 2002; Dean and Levi 2003; Fong and Shibuya 2005). The balance between these sets of characteristics can vary hugely across time and space but, overall, all are believed to play a role (Fuchs 2005; Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005; Cornell and Hartmann 2007).

Clearly, we should be careful in transferring concepts developed in settings such as modern industrial societies or post-industrial cities to locations such as the Southeast Asian Massif. For our purpose in this book then, ethnicity refers to blood ties, cultural variety, local agency, and the political agendas of highland peoples dealing with opportunities and constraints. Ethnicity helps people reproduce an identity they believe in. This is especially important when a group has to maintain itself in the face of fast-changing circumstances such as those related to globalization and, as in our case studies here, when attempting to create viable livelihoods while negotiating particular standardization constraints created by socialist regimes. In turn, this means paying attention to both the growing role of national and global trade flows in these regions, as well as local explanations of distinctiveness. This is an approach that is shared by all the authors in this book.

**The Dilemmas of Livelihoods and Development**

Let us also explain what we mean by “livelihoods,” and how these may connect with ethnicity in the Southeast Asian Massif. Furthermore, how can
livelihood studies help us understand socio-economic change and “development” in this region?

At the most basic level, livelihoods are the means by which people make a living, such as through agriculture, trade, and waged employment. A common image of highland livelihoods in the Southeast Asian Massif focuses on scattered villages following customary ways, with the occasional road or electricity, and with inhabitants engaged in a combination of subsistence agriculture (that is, farmers’ land used for food production), cash cropping, gathering of forest products, and subsidiary trade. This image includes the cultivation of upland dry (non-irrigated) rice, frequently on steep slopes, and the growing of vegetables and maize, the latter mainly as feed for pigs or as an ingredient for alcohol making. Furthermore, a common form of agriculture in the past was “pioneer” shifting cultivation (Conklin 1963), in which migratory groups, such as Miao-Yao speakers, would use land and forests exhaustively before relocating villages every ten to twenty years.8

Yet, these classic images of livelihood practices in the Massif are questionable. Subsistence agriculture and shifting cultivation certainly exist in this region, but many highland peoples in northern Vietnam and southwest China, for instance, have been sedentarized (that is to say, settled on a semi-permanent or permanent basis) for centuries, especially those using irrigated rice terraces under local feudal chiefdoms. Added to this, other villages are becoming sedentarized either through choice or because they have been forced to resettle to lowland sites by state campaigns (see both Daviau and Évrard, this volume). Consequently, challenges to such alleged classical images of highland livelihoods in the Massif have appeared, in part, because academics and development agents have come to realize that many researchers had been influenced by their experiences with the so-called “hill tribe” minorities in northern Thailand. For many years, researchers from the First World found themselves confined to Thailand because it was next to impossible to gain access to China, Vietnam, and Laos, and their findings bear that signature. With approximately one percent of the total highland ethnic minority population of the Massif, the Thailand heritage has been given an importance that today appears disproportionate. For several reasons relating to politics (the advent of socialism), demography, and history (including colonialism), research findings arising from this relatively constricted research hotbed are not often easily transferable to China, Vietnam, and Laos. Contributing to bridging this gap, scholarship based in these three countries is at last flourishing, helping to correct this discrepancy, and conveying a more attuned picture of the highland realities there.

Upland agriculture has often been cited as a reason to encourage resettlement or sedentarization. Highland practices such as shifting cultivation have been blamed for various environmental problems, including lowland flooding
and upland erosion. Undoubtedly, much classic shifting cultivation occurred on land that was previously forested, and farmers burnt forest and other vegetation in order to plant crops and add nutrients to the soil. But ecological geographers and anthropologists have argued that shifting cultivation, in locales with low population density, and without interference from the state or rival communities, is sustainable for upland societies (Conklin 1963; Boulbet 1975). More recently, hydrological researchers have shown that the links between upland agriculture and these environmental problems are likely to be exaggerated because fluctuations in soil, rain, and water flows are complex and not always linked to agriculture, and because many upland farmers adjust practices to many of the risks they face (De Koniick 1999; Bonell and Brujinzeel 2004; Brujinzeel 2004; Forsyth and Walker 2008). These findings have been claimed for traditional forms of shifting cultivation, as well as for cultivation under higher population densities or with newer commercialized crops. This work does not suggest that upland agriculture has no environmental implications but questions the certainty with which environmental degradation has been cited by states and other actors to justify resettlement or reforestation.

It is now also widely acknowledged that subsistence agriculture has been supplemented for years through trading or bartering products, or by paid labour. Labour has been an income source from the post-feudal era (that is, roughly from the mid-nineteenth century) until the collectivization of the economies in China, Vietnam, and Laos in the mid-twentieth century. During that period, trade in agricultural products such as opium and home-brewed alcohol was complemented by trading livestock, timber, and a mind-boggling variety of non-timber forest products, including live and dead animals, or parts of animals. Waged agricultural labour also grew markedly after the end of the collectivized era (from the 1950s to the 1980s). In addition, non-agricultural incomes in larger settlements grew considerably in the Massif following numerous state-led industrial projects as part of overarching modernization plans. Indeed, Rigg (2005) notes that one should not only focus on assessing sources of agricultural income from the land around villages, but also acknowledge the growing importance of paid employment and remittances from off-farm labour.

Moreover, it is important to assess to what degree long-term customary land tenure systems have continued to operate in these uplands, or have been reformed or challenged by new systems imposed by successive national regimes over the last century. As China, Vietnam, and Laos undergo economic and political liberalization, opportunities for highland peoples are changing, local decision making has taken on new urgencies, and new property rights and forms of agriculture are merging with ancient ones. Moreover, as land use rights (but not land ownership) are now transferable and marketable, there is increased competition for land (see Mellac, this volume).
These insights into how highland people gain livelihoods are vital for understanding social and economic change in the Massif today. Yet, “livelihoods” mean more than the activities people use to make a living. Understanding livelihoods also requires looking at the less obvious social resources, organizations, local politics, and ethnic and social networks and decision making that underpin economic activities and which can effectively reduce or increase social vulnerability to economic and political change.

The language of the development theorist Amartya Sen is particularly useful in understanding the wider basis of livelihoods (Sen 1984, 1987). Sen suggests that livelihoods are a means of achieving capabilities, or the range of a person’s life options, and are not only a means of achieving an economic income. Similarly, livelihoods reflect the availability of assets, or those valued items that also enhance an individual’s ability to achieve life goals and lifestyles. Such assets might include a combination of physical, natural, and social properties such as infrastructure, land, and social networks along with human talents and skills, and financial resources that provide access to certain livelihoods. Accordingly, a livelihoods approach focuses not only on activities but also on access to these and on how changing social contexts might change the underlying means by which people can seek suitable livelihoods on a long-term and rewarding basis (Ribot and Peluso 2003).

Ethnicity, or the social and cultural networks that maintain local identity, is clearly an important variable when wishing to understand sources of capabilities and assets, as well as access to them.

Recent discussions regarding long-term and rewarding livelihoods within anthropology, human geography, and development studies have used the concept of sustainable livelihoods to refer to how one might make a living that can continue despite upsets or threats to income. Chambers and Conway (1992, 1) define a sustainable livelihood as one that “can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain and enhance its capabilities and assets and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation.” Sensibly, this framework focuses on addressing the vulnerability and poverty of affected peoples as they themselves see these (Chambers and Conway 1992; Scoones 1998; Ribot and Peluso, 2003), and requires “an examination of critical elements such as a livelihood’s impact on resources and its relationship to poverty reduction, security, equity, well-being, and capability” (Turner 2007, 403).

To identify livelihood strategies, many sustainable livelihoods approaches recognize five kinds of capital, or forms of assets available to an individual or within a household, village or region. These capitals are human capital (educational and practical skills, health); natural capital (resources such as land and forests); physical capital (infrastructure such as roads); financial capital (savings, credit); and social capital (networks and relationships of trust) (Bebbington 1999). These assets, in turn, are suggested to allow
vulnerable people to increase livelihood options through three broad strategies: first, agricultural intensification (such as increasing the number of crops per year, including the use of fertilizers, mechanization, or access to more productive land); second, incomes diversification (including the adoption of non-agriculture income in addition to agriculture); and third, creative uses of migration as a means of securing incomes (for example, involving one household member working for cash elsewhere, or an individual travelling to a city to engage in non-agricultural activities on a cyclical, seasonal basis). These capitals have been used by development agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development as the basis of livelihood analyses and aid programs.

Critics, however, propose that seeing diverse communities through the lens of these capitals is to adopt a cookie-cutter style of analysis, a mechanical model that assumes these factors will create success regardless of context, and which overlooks the assumptions employed when using them. According to Hinshelwood (2003, 254, 243) these capitals are “merely a confused diagram and a wordy manual.” Others have suggested that using words such as “capitals” in uncritical, easily transferred ways may reduce the ability for local people to assert their own values in framing development policy (Arce 2003, 204). Indeed, some social analysts have suggested that using the word “capitals” to describe social networks and culture reflects a market-driven outlook; unsurprisingly, the capitals approach was developed largely in countries with liberal economies.

Accordingly, critics have argued that any focus on the five capitals should be matched by an awareness of what these capitals mean in different cultural contexts. Similarly, there is a need to understand how specific cultural and/or political factors govern access to different assets (Ribot and Peluso 2003; Forsyth 2007; Scoones 2009). Assets are not accessible to all citizens equally, including in socialist regimes. Consequently, some observers have argued that we need to incorporate more rigorous forms of bottom-up, rights-based analyses into livelihood studies. Such approaches would consider how ethnic minorities or poor people assert their needs and make decisions, rather than, in the case of development programs, achieve top-down “sham participation” by the poor in pre-set development goals (Baumann 2000, 34; Carney 2003). To that end, in this book we question how far ethnicity, encompassing cultural identity and linkages, should be considered an agent of access, or indeed as an asset itself when wishing to better understand ethnic minority livelihoods in the socialist portion of the Southeast Asian Massif. If one takes on board the five capitals approach, discussed above, then it is the concept of social capital that is assumed, most commonly, to include social associations and networks, ties, and linkages. Some analysts, however, have argued that actors such as the World Bank have used the concept of social capital
in ways that overlook various deeper and indeed, more negative forms of power and control (Portes and Landolt 2000; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Harriss 2002; Radcliffe 2004). Other critics have suggested that this approach avoids deeper understandings of social connectivity – one example being Bourdieu’s earlier formulation (1972) of social capital – along with that other form of capital bypassed by more recent livelihood analysts, namely cultural capital. Under Pierre Bourdieu’s formulation (1972), cultural capital focuses on shared meanings within societies and cultures, which – knowingly or unknowingly – may be used both positively to include more people in decision making or negatively to reinforce existing political power.

In sum, cultural factors, or the presence of shared values and understandings, are a crucial source of support and creativity within livelihood strategies. Yet many critics, including the authors, feel that current approaches to the analysis of livelihoods do not take culture and ethnicity sufficiently into account (Ellis 2000; de Haan and Zoomers 2005). As noted earlier, the aim of this book is therefore to question how and to what extent ethnicity impacts on the fashioning of local livelihoods and how it interacts with other oft-forgotten variables such as political relations and social change.

**Rethinking the Relationship between Livelihoods and Ethnicity**

What, then, needs to be done to understand the relationships between ethnicity and livelihoods better, and how can we illustrate this in the highlands of the Southeast Asian Massif?

As we stated at the start of this chapter, this book is based on three key arguments. First, local people’s ability to forge livelihoods is a product of both external changes, such as political and economic changes, as well as of their own agency, always influenced by ethnic identity and culture. Second, ethnicity is best understood on a transnational basis relating to the existence of cultural and trading links across borders rather than within the restrictive and artificial (at least culturally speaking) context of single countries. And third, we need to view the Massif area in more complex and dynamic terms that go beyond categorizing ethnic minorities as just state-controlled or stateless, or considering all local people as sharing the same political, cultural, and economic characteristics.

We propose a few central routes to advancing these new understandings of the Massif. First, we suggest that studying and understanding ethnicity and culture assists in helping highland peoples achieve effective livelihood strategies. By stating this, we propose that there is a need to indicate how, and in which ways, culture can be assessed and better understood. This has been a recurrent concern for social anthropology in particular, which has advocated research methods adapted to local circumstances and involving long-term observation (Bernard 2005), rather than rapid rural appraisal or largely quantitative strategies used by governments or development agencies.
and that tend to focus on current activities rather than on livelihoods as embedded in longer term decision-making processes and taking into account the nuances of ethnicity. All the chapters in this book offer telling examples of ways to approach local cultures that can lead to more refined understandings of how the inclusion of ethnicity, along with its associated trading and migration links, in the development equation can offer more diverse strategies for enhancing livelihoods while simultaneously retaining – or attempting to retain – a core identity (see Jonsson 2005). In the words of Sarah Turner (2003, 198): “Culture is never static but is constantly being recreated and negotiated by conscious actors. Accordingly, a framework designed to examine [local economic agents] must incorporate the cultural context as a dynamic dimension of human agency.”

Another avenue is to realize how livelihood strategies influence ethnicity. Clearly, it is argued throughout this book that ethnicity bears a significant influence on the local definition and achievement of livelihoods. The substantivist argument (see Stanfield 1986) suggesting that the economy is embedded in cultures and that it cannot be studied advantageously outside its particular local context is convincing in the Southeast Asian Massif but also in the lowlands around it. Turning this proposition around is also true, or more exactly, a retroaction is to be expected: changes in livelihood options will affect ethnic identity through local responses to important political or economic changes, including the indigenization of state reforms or increasingly pervasive markets (Sahlins 1999; Engel Merry 2006).

One example of how identities may change comes from James Scott’s classic work Weapons of the Weak, written after a substantial period of field research on socio-economic change in a Malaysian rural community following mechanization and the introduction of new cropping practices. Scott argues that the withdrawal of customary, kinship-based, and village-based social welfare practices following these changes undermined the livelihoods of poorer villagers and altered the nature of social identities. These alterations occurred because of what he calls the “euphemization of property relations” (Scott 1985, 305) into practices that today’s researchers might call social and cultural capital, such as providing access to food, loans, and social networks between richer and poorer peasants. Yet, in keeping with both the positive and negative aspects of cultural capital, Scott argues that these changes did not simply result in a “victim class” but also created a new class of peasants-turned-capitalists that shattered the old village hegemony. These new capitalists changed identities by disregarding custom in favour of new commercialism. In other words, going back to Sahlins’ typology (1968), these changes tipped the balance of reciprocity in the village of Sedaka in favour of rampant negative reciprocity, in which social linkages become obsolete and the pursuit of personal profit grows dominant. This kind of research by Scott underscores the value of long-term field investigation,
familiarity with a local group, and the resulting deeper insights into how cultural and economic changes interconnect.

A third avenue is to operationalize these lessons for livelihood practices and, especially, understand the role of local agency. As we argue above, the agency of local communities is not merely the willingness and ability to accept and comply with new market opportunities, land reforms, and socio-economic circumstances under globalization and liberalization. Rather, as Sherry Ortner (2006) and Saba Mahmood (2004) argue, it is more fertile to see agency as a locally and culturally informed type of self-maintenance, even resistance, that allows minorities to uphold identities and customary practices that may counteract the external forces of change, even if these have an apparently overwhelming weight.

To some extent, the recent economic-liberalization changes in China, Vietnam, and Laos are still so new that we are only beginning to understand how peasants might respond to the resultant globalization processes and cultural change (Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Sturgeon and Sikor 2004). One cultural analyst, Arjun Appadurai is relatively optimistic. He argues: “Those social orders and groupings that were apparently passive victims of large forces of control and domination were nevertheless capable of subtle forms of resistance and ‘exit’ ... that seemed to be not primordialist in any way” (Appadurai 1996, 145). In other words, even if many do succumb to degrees of subordination and compliance, a fair number of simple farmers can succeed in avoiding domination using restrained, yet successful ways (Kerkvliet 2005, 2009).

How might peasants assert their culture and identity while also complying with new political and economic orders that can at times take the shape of hegemonies? Several authors in this book suggest that new livelihood strategies are, for the subjects in the Massif, experiments in finding solutions to basic needs, while at the same time asserting identity in accordance with their economic potential and the moral dimensions of local cultures. In the terms of James C. Scott (1990) again, the public projects of state reform and marketization coexist with local hidden transcripts, which provide marginal people space to confer among themselves and seek ways to maintain and assert who they want to be and even profit economically without feeling prey to the reforms. Within these forms of resistance lie the combinations of ethnicity and resourcefulness that offer significant assets for livelihood strategies.

How the Chapters Tackle these Themes
This book is a vast and rather ambitious project. When recruiting contributors, transnational research experience, as well as an intimate knowledge of the realities on the ground for the local groups each proposed to write about, were two qualities we sought. In terms of disciplinary background, we were...
eager to build a degree of diversity within the social sciences in order to
disembed case studies from potentially restrictive intellectual disciplinary
boundaries, often tied to partisan discourses that do not always stand the
test of time well. We contend that transdisciplinary considerations enrich
our understanding of a complex object such as the Southeast Asian Massif
and its populations.

Thus, contributors to this book are evenly spread among the fields of social
anthropology, development studies, and human geography. They have in
common broad field experience in one or several highland areas in the
Southeast Asian Massif – particularly the socialist segment of it – combined
with critical publications on the highland minority groups in the region. In
addition, beyond these disciplines and the six countries the authors origin-
ate from, half belong to French-speaking academia and thus bring an intel-
lectual tradition and a series of insights on the region that many among the
English-speaking audience are not always entirely familiar with. This com-
bination of disciplines, experience, and intellectual background brings a
unique depth to this collection.

The case studies have been arranged according to the degree to which the
livelihoods of the groups under investigation are integrated into the market
economy, ranging from those most remote from the market to those most
dynamically involved in it. Each chapter is based on a given ethnic group’s
profile and signature agency, not in relation to a specific national situation,
which would run against the transnational objective we favour. The resulting
picture shows, among other details, that integration in the market is intim-
ately linked to the degree of political and economic formalization each
group achieved before the Communist takeovers in the three countries
under consideration. The initial chapters are based on lineage groups (for
whom social organization was or is based primarily on kinship), such as the
Drung, Tarieng, Khmu, and Hmong. These groups show the least degree of
market integration and sometimes also the weakest forms of agency in dealing
with outside influences. Geographical isolation, which has sheltered
some of these groups from the unmediated reach of state administration
(Scott 2009), could be part of the explanation as to why this situation exists.
The book then moves to ethnic groups that were functionally integrated
into a feudal system before colonization or Communist victories, either as
a dominant group or as commoners, and which seem to have adopted market
practices more rapidly. Does this mean that their agency is also weak and
they simply give in to modernizing pressures? Not necessarily so, as the cases
of the Hani, Tày/Thái, Yi, and Dai seem to suggest. Does that mean that the
more integrated in the market they are, the more hazy their ethnic identity
becomes? Nothing is less sure. Ethnicity, let us recall, is fluid and prone to
strategizing.
Turning now to each chapter, the following four chapters, Chapters 2 to 5, focus on lineage groups. In Chapter 2, geographically as much as culturally, the Drung, a small shaoshu minzu of Yunnan province, stand uncommonly remote from the political centres of China’s southwest. In this chapter, “Economic Marginalization and Social Identity among the Drung People of Northwest Yunnan,” Stéphane Gros, a social anthropologist, discusses ethnic identity and political as well as economic change through time in this distant northwestern corner of the province. The Drung have long been pushed to the extreme of dependency and exploitation by more powerful neighbours. It was only at the end of the imperial era in the early 1950, when the revolutionary administration finally reached them, that they experienced a welcome relief from chronic domination. By retracing the Drung people’s history of relationships with their powerful neighbours and their inclusion into the People’s Republic of China, Gros shows how they experienced successive forms of dependency that eventually impacted on their sense of identity. The Drung embody the notion of the isolated and subjugated “tribe” in the highlands of the Southeast Asian Massif, a politically weak society falling prey to predation and, later, struggling to “get a grip” on socialist modernity. New economic opportunities such as tourism, Gros assesses, appear to be just another way for the Drung to remain marginalized.

Only slightly less isolated but more numerous than the Drung, the Tarieng dwell on the border between southern Laos and central Vietnam. Also a lineage society, the Tarieng have been active through history in a dominant role to some groups in their vicinity, when the opportunity to trade slaves presented itself, while just as often falling victim to the lowland powers surrounding them. Times have changed since the 1950s, though, with the Vietnam War and the sudden geostrategic value of their customary territory, located on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Since 1975, socialism has also had its impacts. As such, in Chapter 3, “Integration of a Lineage Society on the Laos-Vietnam Border,” Steeve Daviau, a social anthropologist, looks at Tarieng identity by analyzing the recent changes in their lives stemming from their adaptation to state-led resettlement programs. The Tarieng, like many other highland minorities in Laos, face overwhelming external vectors of change. Forced resettlement and compulsory clustering of small villages are efficient mechanisms of surveillance and control of such non-Lao, animist minorities and speed up their integration into the Lao nation. These mechanisms leave Tarieng farmers with few options, one being to start to move, looking for unskilled, low-paid wage work in the mid- and lowlands. However, despite a totalitarian political climate, the Tarieng population is not altogether passive. The Tarieng undertake elaborate and diverse strategies, reactions, and forms of resistance at the local level in an attempt to maintain some autonomy. Nevertheless, their case exemplifies some of the ways in which a strong
state can put minority groups under economic, social, cultural, and political integrationist pressures and use its strategic power to break down ancient social fabric.

Also in Laos, this time in the north of the country, close to Burma and China, the case of the Khmu appears somewhat more encouraging. Here, Olivier Évrard, a development anthropologist, has researched the historical emergence of identities and new livelihoods among Laos’ largest minority group, with half a million people. He especially considers, in Chapter 4, “Oral Histories Of Livelihoods and Migration Under Socialism and Post-socialism among the Khmu of Northern Laos,” the role of migration as part of households’ livelihood strategies and points to the fact that livelihoods are not just located on one’s own farming land or trading premises but also exist through travel and by connecting into helpful commercial networks. Évrard also provides a useful example of a biographical method for investigating how specific individuals express their agency in seeking specific livelihoods.

In spite of being classified as one of the most primitive and poor minority nationalities in Vietnam, the Hmong farmers and traders in Lào Cai province discussed in Claire Tugault-Lafl eur and Sarah Turner’s Chapter 5, “Of Rice and Spice: Hmong Livelihood and Diversification in the Northern Vietnam Uplands,” show a high degree of cultural adaptability in negotiating modernity while jealously protecting a core identity. Tugault-Lafl eur and Turner, two human geographers, focus on how Hmong have engaged with cardamom production and trade within broader complex livelihood strategies. They take an actor-oriented approach to livelihoods as they root to focusing on local ethnic relations and culturally rooted decision-making processes. After an examination of Hmong livelihood coping tactics during the socialist and post-socialist periods more generally, the authors focus on current-day Hmong livelihood portfolios while unravelling the adoption of strategies of income diversification that allow Hmong households to adapt to local-level political and economic transformations. These transformations have included the creation of a national park in the district and consequent restrictions on forest use, a ban on opium production and timber felling, as well as new market integration opportunities.

In the next four chapters, sedentarized groups long embedded in feudal systems take the front stage. With 1.5 million people, the Hani in southern Yunnan are one of the more numerous shaoshu minzu of China; their representatives, under the ethnonym Akha, can be found across the borders in several adjacent countries in the Massif. Two chapters in this book focus on the Hani ( Chapters 6 and 9). Chapter 6, “Hani Agency and Ways of Seeing Environmental Change on the China-Vietnam Border,” is written by John McKinnon, a development geographer long acquainted with highland Thailand and who then studied Hani communities of Yunnan in the course
of a New Zealand development aid, participatory research project. McKinnon focuses on the adoption of state directives, and later, cash crops, in Hani villages near the Vietnam border and the environmental outcomes of these, as well as how Hani identity appeared to be subjugated by state directives. McKinnon describes how Hani communities received and then attempted to “indigenize” the development options put to them. He further shows how their ethnic identity was able to reappear when their communities were brought together to face the environmental consequences of recent livelihood decisions. McKinnon criticizes years of outside intervention by the state and development agencies that have not sufficiently appreciated local values and customs. As an alternative, he illustrates how local Hani leaders have been able to assert their identity and some autonomy through traditional land use conservation measures. Whether the Hani will now be able to circumvent the far-reaching implications of the Go West national program of modernization in the highlands remains to be seen.

Chapter 7, “Land Reform and Changing Identities in Two Tai-Speaking Districts in Northern Vietnam,” explores the links between land reform and identities in communities of northern Vietnam belonging to the Thái and Tày minority nationalities. Marie Mellac, a human geographer, considers how recent changes to land allocation and related laws have allowed local groups to negotiate, with uneven success, access to land and the relationship that these changes have with the adoption of non-agricultural income and hence livelihood diversification. Land tenure stands at the core of territorialization processes and takes an active part in the social organization of these formerly feudal groups. As such, large-scale land reforms carried out by (post-) socialist Vietnam over the last twenty years have interfered with customary social rights within each community and altered the political and economic balance between neighbouring groups, also affecting the farmers’ relationships with political institutions at every level. Mellac surmises that these reforms may lead to the homogenization of local society with mainstream Vietnamese culture through the erosion of ethnic identities.

Yunnan tourism in the early twenty-first century relies heavily on merchandizing ethnic diversity as a local renewable resource. Studying the case of the Yi, social anthropologist Margaret Swain analyzes, in Chapter 8, “Commoditized Ethnicity for Tourism Development in Yunnan,” the recent tourism boom in Yunnan and how such change influences Yi identity and livelihoods. Using the examples of groups in two tourist sites – the Sani in Stone Forest (Shilin) and the Bai in Dali – Swain looks at issues of equality in terms of gender, ethnicity, and class, and the promise of cosmopolitan discourse to shape opportunities in selling one’s own (or someone else’s) ethnic identity. Building on a growing body of research on the tourist industry in the region, she argues that tourism offers great diversity for non-agricultural incomes among minorities. Yet, as has been observed in many
other similar situations, the downside is the tendency, rampant throughout China, to commoditize ethnicity as an attraction; an ethnicity, that is, reduced to benign exotic characteristics and devoid of any political potency. She suggests in these cases, that while staged identities are presented to visitors, more meaningful changes still occur within groups but remain less visible and more difficult to assess.

Finally, the case of communities among the Dai (Tai Lue) and Hani (Akha) groups in Xishuangbanna in the far south of Yunnan, near Laos, appear like a success story. Development geographer Janet Sturgeon, in Chapter 9, “Rubber Transformations: Post-Socialist Livelihoods and Identities for Akha and Tai Lue Farmers in Xishuangbanna, China,” observes the influence and impact of state-led programs for rubber plantations in Yunnan on local livelihoods and identities among these two shaoshu minzu. Sturgeon argues that the new trend of taking up rubber plantation production represents an extension of neo-liberal governance to this region following the entry of China to the World Trade Organization. It turns out, she explains, that Hani rubber farmers emerge as savvy entrepreneurs renegotiating land use and entering markets in this globalizing moment, though not without unsettling the identities of both themselves and state farm workers. As state rubber farms slide toward bankruptcy, Akha rubber farmers, Sturgeon argues, are getting rich. It is suggested that the co-evolution of new governance offers opportunities but also presents new dilemmas for highlanders, as the state requires them to take more responsibility for providing social services such as education and health care. Nationalism appears as a means of asserting identity and livelihoods in the face of changes imposed by the Chinese state.

Finally, in the Conclusion to the book, “Lesson for the future,” Jean Michaud draws from these case studies the lesson that, to fruitfully rethink the relationships between ethnicity and livelihoods and to assess how well highland minorities in China, Vietnam, and Laos are faring in these turbulent times, agents of development would gain much from learning to pay closer attention to local factors such as culture and agency. Michaud proposes that deadlines and tangible results should not be the only guiding lines along which projects are designed and implemented. If more importance could be placed instead on factoring in local historical and cultural ways of sharing and understanding the relationships between livelihood strategies, agency, local politics and resistance, then the programs put in place by state development actors, overseas development practitioners and academics, and non-governmental organisations would stand a better chance of yielding long-term dividends for ethnic minorities in the Southeast Asian Massif.
Notes
1 The notions of ethnic minority and national minorities are being used cautiously here as a historical construct that is a consequence to the installation of the modern nation-states in the region (Michaud 2006).
2 For a global presentation of the Zomia debate, see Michaud 2010.
3 It should be noted here that in this book some authors speak to the current situation in these locales as “socialist” while others use the term “post-socialist.” This is personal choice, but in all cases authors are cognizant of the recent liberalization of these economies, including their opening up to outside market integration forces, while politically these states retain certain socialist principles of rule and a firm hand over political organization as well as specific “takes” on ethnic minorities, discussed here.
4 The Thái and the Tày in Vietnam are not to be confused with the Thai of Thailand. All belong to the “Tai” language sub-family, which refers to any speaker of the Tai branch of the larger Tai-Kadai language family, which includes all speakers of one form or another of that vast cluster of languages found in Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Burma, Assam, Vietnam, Laos, or indeed Thailand where most of them dwell (Michaud 2006).
5 Recent history suggests that it is only in southwestern China and northeastern Burma, where some minority groups such as the Zhuang, Yi, Hani, Shan, or Dai reach several million people, that forms of resistance to cultural assimilation can sometimes arise. For most of the other groups, resistance must be subtle, sometimes covert, often hidden (see Scott 1990, 2009).
6 Based on Michaud (2009).
7 Essentialism implies ascribing an eternal and discrete sense of identity to peoples, rather than seeing how ethnic identities coexist with other social and cultural factors.
8 The name “swidden” has been given to fields that are cleared and cultivated in these ways.
9 We do also acknowledge that for many, time is of the essence, especially where the state might not look particularly favourably on long-term research by outsiders. A summary of faster yet effective ways to use anthropological methods can be found in publications such as Handwerker (2002).

References


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